Avoidance of Personal Injury Release for Mutual Mistake of Fact by Carlisle, Gerald
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Cleveland State Law Review Law Journals
1958
Avoidance of Personal Injury Release for Mutual
Mistake of Fact
Gerald Carlisle
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Contracts Commons, and the Torts Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Cleveland State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
Avoidance of Personal Injury Release for Mutual Mistake of Fact, 7 Clev.-Marshall L. Rev. 98 (1958)
Avoidance of Personal Injury Release
for Mutual Mistake of Fact
Gerald Carlisle*
L ET US TAKE THE CASE of an unlimited, general release of a
claim for all damages for personal injuries, known and un-
known, present and future. Then suppose that the consideration
is grossly inadequate for the injuries apparent later, but fully
adequate for the situation as it seemed at the time of release.
The releasor is now sick, sore, sorry and definitely suffering from
injuries more serious, of greater extent, or of a different nature
than those known at the time the release was granted.
The releasor now desires to avoid this bar, and to bring
action against the tortfeasor.
It is not difficult to see that the instrument termed a release,
is a contract that clearly portrays a meeting of the minds. It
explicitly states a release from liability for known, unknown,
present, and future injuries.
In attempting to avoid such a release the party ordinarily
may allege the grounds he may have under the law of contracts.
In personal injury releases, these grounds usually take the form
of charges of fraud or misrepresentation,' coercion,2 inequitable
circumstances,3 mutual mistake of law,4 unilateral mistake of
fact,5 inadequate consideration, or mutual mistake of fact. 7 The
fraud charge, along with its kindred charges of coercion, in-
equitable conduct, and misrepresentation, when proved provides
a fair and reasonable cause for avoidance of the release. While
* A. B., College of Wooster; a second year student at Cleveland-Marshall
Law School; and Acting Clerk of Court, Euclid Municipal Court, Euclid,
Ohio.
1 Birmingham Ry., Light & Power Co., v. Jordan, 170 Ala. 530, 54 S. 280
(1911). For other example of fraud see table at end of article.
2 Ross v. Koenig, 129 Conn. 403, 28 A. 2d 875 (1942).
3 Keller v. Wolf, 58 N. W. 2d 891 (Minn., 1953); Norris v. Cohen, 27 N. W.
2d 277 (Minn., 1947).
4 Carpenter v. Detroit Forging Co., 191 Mich. 45, 157 N. W. 374 (1916).
5 Sullivan v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry. Co., 331 Ill. App. 613, 73 N. E. 2d 632 (1947).
6 Doyle v. Teasdale, 263 Wis. 328, 57 N. W. 2d 381 (1953).
7 Jordan v. Brady Transfer and Storage Co., 226 Iowa 137, 284 N. W. 73
(1939); McCarthy v. Eddings, 127 P. 2d 883 (Colo., 1942); Fraser v. Glass,
311 IM. App. 336, 35 N. E. 2d 953 (1941). For other citations see table at
end of article.
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MISTAKEN PERSONAL INJURY RELEASE
the mutual-mistake-of-fact defense is the most controversial, it
nevertheless is becoming more widely accepted every year. We
shall deal here with the defense of mutual mistake.
Mutual Mistake of Fact
A Federal Court applying Oklahoma law describes a mutual
mistake of fact as a mistaken "past or present fact, material to the
agreement .... The release will not be set aside where mistake
is one of the prophesy or opinion of future development or per-
manency." 8
In this 1939 Oklahoma decision, the factual situation showed
a head injury being diagnosed by a physician as a slight con-
cussion. In consideration of a full release of all past and present,
known and unknown injuries, the plaintiff received $250.00.
Subsequently, it was discovered that her head injuries were of
a different and more permanent type. The Court set aside the
release on the grounds of mutual mistake of fact.
An Illinois Appellate Court avoided a release for mutual
mistake of fact as to the "nature and seriousness" of injuries,
and added that only a "reasonably diligent search for injuries
need have been made by the releasor before releasing." 9
Another example of mutual mistake is shown in Southwest
Machine & Pump Co. v. Jones.10 Here the facts of a displaced
sacro-iliac joint and splinters of glass in the person's temple had
not shown up on X-rays taken previous to the release. Inade-
quate consideration, and mutual mistake as to the extent and
character of the injuries were the reasons given for the avoid-
ance.
In the above examples and in many others releases have
been avoided for mutual mistake of fact as to the nature and
seriousness of injuries, as to the extent and character of the
injuries, and because the injury was later found to be of a more
permanent type than previously expected. Mistakes not included
as mutual mistakes of fact have been those of prophesy, or opin-
ion of future development, or of permanency. Thus some courts
would allow an avoidance for a mistake in diagnosis of per-
manency or seriousness of injury, while others expressly would
not do so. This leads not to certainty, but rather to confusion.
8 Tulsa City Lines v. Mains, 107 F. 2d 377 (C. C. A. 10, 1939).
9 Fraser v. Glass, 311 Ill. App. 336, 35 N. E. 2d 953 (1941).




In attempting to clarify somewhat the concept usually
meant by the courts' term-mutual-mistake-of-fact-we may
safely say that, in order to justify an avoidance, most courts look
for the appearance of an injury that was completely overlooked
at the time of the release. Needless to say, this search and
categorization leads the law into the interesting and specialized
field of medico-legal study.
A 1957 Florida decision 1 typifies quite well the vague area
of distinction between mistake as to injury and mistake as to
prophesy or consequences. Here a woman, injured in a bus
accident, signed a release for a few dollars, after her doctor had
said that the injury was nothing serious, but only a mild injury
to her back. Then it turned out to be a seriously herniated disc.
She sought rescission of the release, citing Boole v. Florida
Power & Light Co.,1 2 where an injury diagnosed as a chest bruise
and settled for fifteen dollars, turned out to be a fatal heart
injury, and it was held to be a jury question in proceedings for
rescission. The Boole case represented a mistake as to the
injury itself, the court reasoned. But, here, any mistake made
was only one as to the ultimate consequences, not as to the
injury itself-i.e., only a mistake in valuation. Said the court:
"While a release executed pursuant to a mistake as to a past or
present fact may on proper showing be set aside... unknown or
unexpected consequences of known injuries will not result in
invalidating the release. An erroneous opinion or error of judg-
ment respecting future conditions as a result of presently known
facts will not justify setting the release aside ... "
In the DeWitt case a great amount of medical testimony
showed that the herniated disc was a possible future result of
stresses present, and noticed by the plaintiff's physician, before
the release. This case is one of the best examples of a precise
holding to the theory of avoidance only on mistake of past or
present fact.
Here again, it is interesting to note that the release in the
DeWitt case, among other things, released the tortfeasor from
liability for "any and all known and unknown personal injuries."
This was "typical of such documents," 13 the court said.
11 DeWitt v. Miami Transit Co., 95 S. 2d 898 (Fla., 1957).
12 147 Fla. 589, 3 S. 2d 335 (1941).
13 DeWitt case, n. 11.
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Mutual Mistake of Fact-Not the Answer
Avoidance of a release on the ground of mutual mistake of
fact seems, in some ways, to make a mockery of contractual re-
lease of any-and-all-known-and-unknown-injuries. The intent
shown by the signing of such an instrument could not be more
plain; yet the courts persist in avoiding such releases because
some injury was unknown at the time of contracting. Is this not
a contradiction of legal reasoning! One clearly contracts to re-
lease for unknown injuries, and yet one does not. The courts at-
tempt to encourage settlements out of court, yet they void the
release contracts on the grounds which are in direct conflict
with the expressed intent of both parties to those contracts; that
is, in releases for known or unknown injuries.14
A Sound Reason for Avoidance
An older and better reasoned theory on avoiding releases is
found in Morris v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. 15 There a rider had
merely bumped his head in a train wreck, and felt that the five
dollars paid as consideration for a release was sufficient to pay
for his slight pain and his taxi fare. The release also indicated
that this consideration was to pay for any and all known or un-
known injuries. Later, he found he was suffering from a very
serious brain injury. This court reasoned that "where a party
who has a claim against another for personal injuries agrees
upon a settlement of his claim, and accepts a sum of money or
other token of value in settlement of such a claim, he is, in the
absence of fraud, or concealment, concluded by the settle-
ment .... Under any other rule than that here announced, no
one could ever make a settlement and take a release with the
assurance that it would not be attacked and set aside on the
statement of the person who executed it that when he signed
it he was mistaken as to the extent of his injuries." This rule
respects the meeting-of-the-minds theory that underlies a con-
tract and the bargain duly made in the contract of release. Still,
the cry of the injured party who is sick and sorry should not go
unheard, even under the general rule that the release should
stand in the absence of fraud or concealment.
It is well known that some ugly instances of injuries de-
veloping after release result from the speedy action of the claim
14 See Kowalke v. Milwaukee Electric R. & Light Co., 103 Wis. 472, 79 N.
W. 762 (1899); Larson v. Sventek, 211 Minn. 490, 1 N. W. 2d 608 (1942).
15 Morris v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 99 S. E. 133 (Ga., 1919).
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol7/iss1/10
CLEVELAND-MARSHALL LAW REVIEW
adjustor who seeks to obtain signatures at the very scene of the
accident, or as soon as possible thereafter. Such instances also
may result from the eagerness of the impatient claimant. Many
of these unfortunate claimants would not be in a sorry situation
if they had waited even for a short time. In Morris v. Seaboard,
mentioned above, the claim was adjusted and release given
within twenty-four hours after the accident. This ordinarily is
not even long enough for a whiplash victim to become stiff and
sore. Such situations unfortunately are not uncommon. They
suggest a need for better discipline of investigators and adjustors
in some companies.
In North Dakota, by statute, a release is voidable if made
while the injured party is disabled or within thirty days after this
injury. Thereafter, personal representatives may avoid it within
six months.16 This statute represents a sound and progressive
improvement in the law governing the problem of the hasty
release.
In essence, it seems to be desirable to make the law such
that we will not be compelled to ignore basic-bargain principles
of contracts in order to provide for the rights of persons who are
too hasty in signing releases of personal injury claims.
Following is a chart of the law of the several states as to the
elements necessary for avoiding personal injury releases.
State Basis for Avoiding a Release
Alabama Fraud or misrepresentation 17
Arkansas Mutual mistake of fact 18
Arizona Intent of releasor governs (fraud)19
California Mutual mistake of fact20
Colorado Mutual mistake of fact
2
'
16 No. Dak. Rev. Code (1943) Sec. 9-0808 and Sec. 9-0809. Also, Anno.
Code of Md., Art. 79, Sec. 11, provides that a release, if signed within five
days after injury, may be avoided within sixty days.
17 Birmingham Ry., Light and Power Co. v. Jordon, 170 Ala. 530 54 S.
280 (1911).
18 Ozan Graysonia Lumber Co. v. Ward, 66 S. W. 2d 1074 (Ark., 1934).
19 Fagerberg v. Phoenix Flour Mills, 50 Ariz. 227, 71 P. 2d 1002 (1937).
20 Kostick v. Swain, 253 P. 2d 531 (Calif., 1953); Graham v. Atchison, T.
& S. F. Ry., 176 F. 2d 819 (C. A. A. 9, 1949); Jordon v. Guerra, 136 P. 2d 367
(Calif., 1943); Calif. Civil Code, Sec. 1542: "A general release does not
extend to claims which the creditor does not know or suspect to exist in
his favor at the time of executing the release, which if known by him
must have materially affected his settlement with the debtor." Also con-
strued to apply to personal injury releases. See Backus v. Sessions, 17
Calif. 2d 380, 110 P. 2d 51 (1941); O'Meara v. Haiden, 204 Calif. 354, 268
P. 334 (1928); Note, 1 Stanford L. R. 298 (1949).
21 McCarthy v. Eddings, 127 P. 2d 883 (Colo., 1942).
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22 Ross v. Koenig,
Fraud or coercion 22
Mutual mistake of fact
23
Mutual mistake of fact
24
Fraud or misrepresentation 25
Mutual mistake of fact
26
Serious mistake by one party; 27 also mutual
mistake of fact
28
Mutual mistake of fact
29
Mutual mistake of fact
30
Mutual mistake of fact
31
Mutual mistake of fact
32
Fraud or misrepresentation 33
If signed within five days after injured, may
be voided within sixty days
34
Fraud or concealment - slight indication of
mutual mistake 35
Mutual mistake of fact and law36
Unilateral mistake if one was ignorant of fact




129 Conn. 403, 28 A. 2d 875 (1942).
23 Kiloski v. Penn. R. Co., 96 F. Supp. 321 (D. C., Del., 1951); Tatman v.
Philadelphia, I. & W. R. Co., 85 A. 716 (Del., 1913).
24 Boole v. Florida Power & Light Co., 147 Fla. 589, 3 S. 2d 335 (1941);
DeWitt v. Miami Transit Co., 95 S. 2d 898 (Fla., 1957).
25 Morris v. Seaboard Airline Ry., 99 S. E. 133 (Ga., 1919).
26 Estes v. Magee, 62 Idaho 82, 109 P. 2d 631 (1940).
27 Sullivan v. Elgin, I. & E. R. Co., 331 Ill. App. 613, 73 N. E. 2d 632 (1947).
28 Fraser v. Glass, 311 Ill. App. 336, 35 N. E. 2d 953 (1941).
29 Automobile Underwriters v. Smith, 133 N. E. 2d 72 (Ind., 1956); Gum-
berts v. Greenburg, 115 N. E. 2d 504 (Ind., 1953).
30 Jordan v. Brady Transfer and Storage Co., 226 Iowa 137, 284 N. W. 73
(1939).
31 Hodgson v. Mutual Benefit Health and Accident Assoc., 153 Kans. 511,
112 P. 2d 121 (1941).
32 Yutz v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 264 Ky. 142, 94 S. W. 2d 326 (1936).
33 Borden v. Sandy River & R. L. R. Co., 110 Me. 327, 86 A. 242 (1913).
34 Anno. Code of Md. Art. 79, Sec. 11.
35 Tewsbury v. Fellsway, 319 Mass. 386, 65 N. E. 2d 918 (1946).
36 Carpenter v. Detroit Forging Co., 191 Mich. 45, 157 N. W. 374 (1916).
37 Keller v. Wolf, 58 N. W. 2d 891 (Minn., 1953); Norris v. Cohen, 223 Minn.
471, 27 N. W. 2d 277 (1947).




















Mutual mistake of fact3 9
Mutual mistake of fact
40
Mutual mistake of fact
41
Mutual mistake of fact
42
Fraud or deceit 43
Mutual mistake of fact 4
4
Mutual mistake of fact4
5
Mutual mistake of fact
46
If given while disabled or within thirty days
after injury47
Fraud or misrepresentation 4
Mutual mistake of fact 49
Fraud or misrepresentation 50
Mutual mistake of fact5 '
Mutual mistake of fact
52
Mutual mistake of fact
5 3
If given inequitable circumstances and igno-
rance (fraud) 54
Mutual mistake of fact 55
39 Cleghorn v. Terminal R. Ass'n. of St. Louis, 289 S. W. 2d 13 (Mo., 1956).
40 Carlson v. Northern Pacific R. Co., 268 P. 549 (Mont., 1928).
41 LaRossa v. Union Pacific Ry. Co., 142 Neb. 290, 5 N. W. 2d 891 (1942);
Schmidt v. City of Lincoln, 151 Neb. 317, 37 N. W. 2d 500 (1949).
42 Poti v. New England Road Machinery Co., 83 N. H. 232, 140 A. 587
(1928); Rickle v. Wyoming Valley Paper Mills, 93 N. H. 191, 38 A. 2d 78
(1944).
43 Reinheart v. Wilbur, 30 N. J. Super. 502, 105 A. 2d 415 (1954); Heuter
v. Coastal Air Lines, 12 N. J. Super. 490, 79 A. 2d 880 (1951).
44 Mendenhall v. Vandeventer, 229 P. 2d 457 (N. Mex., 1956).
45 Wheeler v. State, 286 App. Div. 310, 143 N. Y. S. 2d 83 (1956).
46 Cheek v. Southern Ry. Co., 214 N. C. 152, 198 S. E. 626 (1938).
47 No. Dak. Rev. Code (1943) Sec. 9-0808.
48 Connelley v. U. S. Steel Co., 161 Ohio St. 448, 119 N. E. 2d 843 (1954).
49 Tulsa City Lines v. Mains, 107 F. 2d 377 (C. A. A. 10, 1939); Chicago
R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Perkins, 242 P. 535 (Old., 1925).
50 Seely v. Citizens Traction Co., 179 Pa. 334, 36 A. 229 (1897); Kane v.
Chester Traction Co., 186 Pa. 145, 40 A. 320 (1898).
51 Lawton v. Charleston, & W. C. Ry. Co., 91 S. C. 332, 74 S. E. 750 (1912).
52 Peterson v. Kemper, 70 So. Dak. 427, 18 N. W. 2d 294 (1945); Nilsson v.
Kruger, 69 So. Dak. 312, 9 N. W. 2d 783 (1943).
53 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Humphry, 167 Tenn. 421, 70 S. W. 2d 361
(Tenn., 1934).
54 Premeaux v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 144 Tex. 558, 192 S. W. 2d 138
(1946); Harris v. Sanderson, 178 S. W. 315 (Tex., 1944).
55 Kirchgestner v. Denver & R. G. W. Ry. Co., 218 P. 2d 685 (Utah, 1950).
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Mutual mistake of fact 56
Mutual mistake of fact
57
Fraud or misrepresentation 8
Mutual mistake of fact - inadequate con-
sideration59
Federal Statute Mutual mistake of fact 60
Hawaii Mutual mistake of fact 6'
56 Atlantic Greyhound Lines of West Virginia v. Metz, 70 F. 2d 166 (C. A.
A. 4, 1934).
57 Roberts v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., 93 Wash. 274, 160 P. 965
(1916).
58 Janney v. Virginian Ry. Co., 119 W. Va. 249, 193 S. E. 187 (1937).
59 Doyle v. Teasdale, 263 Wis. 328, 57 N. W. 2d 381 (1953); Jandvt v.
Milwaukee Auto Ins. Co., 255 Wis. 618, 39 N. W. 2d 698 (1949).
60 Federal Employers Liability Act, Sec. 1 et seq.; Sec. 5; 45 U. S. C. A.,
Sec. 51 et seq., Sec. 55; Kilosky v. Penn. Ry. Co., 96 F. Supp. 321 (D. C.
Del., 1951).
61 Silva v. Robert Hind Ltd., 32 Hawaii 936 (1934).
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